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Review of Conference:
“The Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of
International Humanitarian Law”
by Sa brina Ba lga mwa lla
both human rights and humanitarian legal norms. For example,
Doswald-Beck noted that Rule 99, which includes the requirement
of registration of persons in detention, is based on human rights
norms pertaining to the prohibition of disappearances. Although
human rights law differs from humanitarian law in the sense that
the former applies at all times (subject to certain derogations in
“states of emergency”) and the latter applies only in “time of war,”
the Fundamental Guarantees chapter of the study highlights provisions that protect all those involved in armed conflict, regardless
of their status as a civilian, combatant, armed opposition group
member, or other classification.
With respect to the rest of the study, Doswald-Beck indicated, the principles were derived primarily from international
humanitarian law, but human rights law supports the principles set
forth in the chapter on Fundamental Guarantees, including the
prohibition on torture (Rule 90), the prohibition against rape and
others forms of sexual violence (Rule 93), and the prohibition on
slavery and the slave trade (Rule 94).
Doswald-Beck also addressed a scenario in which a customary rule loses support, and a new customary rule arises. She indicated that Rule 53, prohibiting the starvation of civilians as a
method of warfare, was not embodied in any treaty prior to the
adoption of the Additional Protocols in 1977. The Additional
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SEPTEMBER 28, 2005, the American University
Washington College of Law (WCL) hosted the North
American launch of the International Committee for the
Red Cross’ (ICRC) study, Customary International
Humanitarian Law. The launch conference, entitled “The
Reaffirmation of Custom as an Important Source of International
Humanitarian Law,” featured the study’s co-authors, Jean-Marie
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, as well as a distinguished panel
of academics, U.S. government officials, and attorneys. Judge Theodor
Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, delivered the keynote address, “The Revival of Customary
International Law,” in which he discussed the study and the relevance of
customary international law to international criminal tribunals.
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, legal advisor to the ICRC, began the
conference with an introduction to the 5,000-page study, which
took almost 10 years to complete. The study commenced in 1995
and followed a mandate from the parties to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions for the ICRC to identify rules found to have attained
the status of customary humanitarian law. The study is particularly
significant, remarked Henckaerts, because customary rules are considered binding upon all nations, regardless of whether or not they
are signatories to the Geneva Conventions or its Additional
Protocols. Further, 147 of the 161 rules enumerated in the study
were found to be applicable to non-international armed conflicts,
which are typically subject to far fewer treaty rules than international conflicts.

PROFESSOR LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK
FOLLOWING HENCKAERTS’ ADDRESS, a roundtable discussion
reflected on the study and its international significance. Louise
Doswald-Beck began by elaborating on the process used by the
Steering Committee in developing this landmark study. DoswaldBeck specified that the committee inductively gleaned the principles
from state practice collected in six separate subject areas. The committee compared the derived principles to the state practice documentation and then reorganized and refined the rules. She noted that the
committee did this twice before drafting the commentary. The committee opted to include a separate volume detailing the state practices
that support each rule, which Doswald-Beck noted would permit
practitioners to look at state practice and draw their own conclusions
regarding the principles.
Doswald-Beck also noted that international human rights law
played an important role in the study. “I think it is abundantly
clear,” she said, “that human rights law has had a direct effect on
international humanitarian law. You only have to look at the wording of the Additional Protocols of 1977 to recognize rules, which
are typically worded in human rights language.” The distinction
between humanitarian and human rights law, she continued, has
become less clear over time, and it is now impossible to create
purely humanitarian rules when examining behaviors that reflect
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Col. W. Hays Parks, USMCR (Ret.), Lt. Col. Burrus Carnahan (Ret.),
Michael Matheson, Joshua Dorosin, Jordan Paust, Louise Doswald-Beck,
and Robert Goldman.

Protocols, however, influenced the formation of such a rule, and
there was sufficient state practice to establish it as custom. The
assessment of the prohibition of reprisals, specifically attacks on
civilians during hostilities, was more difficult for the ICRC committee. Doswald-Beck stated that there used to be a rule that permitted reprisal attacks against civilians in reprisals, but it is clear
that the rule has lost support from a vast majority of the international community, and most believe it is now unlawful. She noted,
however, that three states have ambiguous practices with respect to
this rule, and that the lack of uniformity barred the derivation of a
new rule regarding reprisals. On this matter Doswald-Beck cited
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argued, are problematic because the ICRC study “seemed to indicate that the rules contained in Additional Protocol I are, in fact,
applicable to non-international armed conflicts as well, which to
me is a surprising result, considering the number of countries that
have specifically not signed the First Additional Protocol. So to
develop a theory that would bind states as a matter of customary
international law to rules that many states specifically decided not
to sign up for in the context of specific conventions will be viewed
as a surprising result.”
When one looks at states that have not signed the Additional
Protocols, Dorosin observed, most of them are states that have
engaged in armed conflict. On this matter, Dorosin concluded
with an argument from Daniel Bethlehem, Professor of Law at
Cambridge University, who participated in an earlier panel on the
ICRC study. “You have specially-affected states that as yet have not
signed up to certain protocols, and then you have a study that
seeks to announce rules that are binding as a matter of customary
international law on specially-affected states,” Dorosin remarked.
“I think that raises particularly challenging questions about the
methodology.”

an argument by Ian Brownlie that in a situation where customary
law has lost support and there is no sufficient state practice to support a new rule, there is no rule, but a web of bilateral relations.
Only bilateral agreements would apply. At the same time,
Doswald-Beck noted that the ICRC study takes into account other
documents, such as the Martens clause,1 case law, and underlying
principles of human rights law, all of which indicate that widespread practices prohibiting reprisals should not be ignored.

JOSHUA DOROSIN
DOROSIN, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISOR to the U.S.

JOSHUA
Department of State, noted that the ICRC study is an important
work, which the State Department considers very useful. But
Dorosin, speaking in a personal capacity, took issue with the
methodology of the study. He posed a number of questions regarding state practice and opinio juris, particularly with respect to specially-affected states and persistent objectors.
Dorosin cited three major criticisms of the study’s reliance on
state practice. “One of the basic problems with state practice in this
field,” he noted, “is that so much state practice and so much of this
field is already covered by conventions, and so it raises a basic ques-

“The launch conference . . . featured the study’s co-authors,
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck,
as well as a distinguished panel of academics,
U.S. government officials, and attorneys.”
PROFESSOR MICHAEL MATHESON
MATHESON, A PROFESSOR at the George Washington

tion as to whether one can draw conclusions about customary
humanitarian law from the practice of states, which is basically the
implementation of a treaty obligation.” Dorosin concluded that it
is difficult to draw precise conclusions based on state practice. He
also questioned the ICRC’s use of military manuals as corroborating evidence of customary rules. “States place rules in manuals for
a variety of reasons, not always because they believe they are legally obligated to do so,” he observed. “Often practice that is reflected in the manuals is based on a policy of including a certain rule,
rather than a sense that the rule flows from a legal obligation.”
Finally, Dorosin criticized the study for relying on the practices of
non-states and non-governmental organizations, particularly with
respect to non-binding resolutions. These practices, he concluded,
are insufficiently indicative of custom, and cannot support the
rules derived from them.
Dorosin explained that, with respect to the challenge of finding opinio juris to support its principles, the ICRC examined density of practice and inferred that state practice is based on a clear
view of a legal obligation. “I am skeptical whether one can rely
heavily on the density of practice approach,” Dorosin contended,
although he noted that the U.S. State Department would consider the matter further. Dorosin also noted that many of the rules are
readily identifiable as principles in Additional Protocol I, which
only applies to international armed conflict. These principles, he

MICHAEL
University Law School and a member of the United Nations
International Law Commission, began by congratulating
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck on the study, which he noted was
bound to be a significant event in the field and an important step
in the development of customary international law. With respect
to the role of dissenting states in the formation of custom,
Matheson noted that to establish a customary rule, state practice
must be extensive and representative, even among “specially-affected” states. On this point, the ICRC study raises the question of
whether it is legally possible in this field for states to be “persistent
objectors,” but does not provide an answer. Matheson observed
that the issue of persistent objectors is reflected in various aspects
of the study, including Rule 43, based on Article 35 of Additional
Protocol I, which prohibits means and methods of warfare expected to cause widespread and severe damage to the environment. The
study finds this to be a principle of international customary law
based on virtually uniform acceptance, notwithstanding objections
in whole or in part by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, which the study considers “specially-affected” with respect
to possession of nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, Matheson remarked, when any of these
states objects to a treaty but agrees with the principles set forth
14

Lt. Col Carnahan cited Common Article 1 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which requires the parties to respect the provisions of the Conventions “in all circumstances” and limits special
agreements among parties. Yet, he argued, Article 47 and Rule 108
deny POW status to an entire class of persons, even in instances
where the combatants distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise follow the laws of war. Lt. Col. Carnahan
maintained that if Rule 108 was customary law, the custom must
have arisen after the 1949 Geneva Conventions were signed. “If
Rule 108 is truly a rule of customary law, then it applies to all states,
including parties to the Geneva Conventions who are not parties to
Additional Protocol I. Rule 108 thus implies that specific provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions can be altered not only through
the amendment process of the conventions themselves, but also
through subsequent customary practice,” he said.
Looking to the commentary on Rule 108 for interpretive
guidance, Lt. Col. Carnahan noted that the study based this rule
on military manuals that deny POW status to mercenaries, but
that most of these manuals were from states that were either parties to Additional Protocol I or were considering becoming parties
to the Protocol. As evidence of state practice, he continued, the
manuals of Israel and the United States are particularly significant
in that neither state is a party, or intends to become a party, to
Additional Protocol I. The Israeli military manual indicates that
“Article 47 is accepted as customary international law, and is therefore binding.” On the other hand, Lt. Col. Carnahan observed, the
U.S. manual is problematic because it specifically objects to the
denial of prisoner-of-war status to mercenaries. He stated that the
United States government “has always protested vigorously against
any attempt by other nations to punish American citizens as mercenaries.” Lt. Col. Carnahan argued that this objection by the
United States is even more important given the U.S. government’s
prevalent use of security contractors in conflict situations, which
blurs the widely-accepted definition of “mercenary.”
Additionally, Lt. Col. Carnahan was critical of the reasoning
underlying Rule 74 of the ICRC study, which finds that customary international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons. He
argued that this international norm only pertains to “first use”
and that most states maintain the right to retaliate in kind to a
chemical weapons attack. He noted that the commentary to the
rule indicates that 21 states have reservations to this effect. The
ICRC study, however, excuses these reservations, and states that
16 of these states are party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which explicitly prohibits all use of chemical weapons,
including in-kind retaliation. Lt. Col. Carnahan argued that this
reasoning ignores the political nature of the CWC. There is no
indication, he argued, that parties to the CWC intended to alter
the customary law surrounding the use of chemical weapons in
warfare. He also noted that the “supreme interest” clause of the
CWC2 permits States Parties to opt out of its provisions, which
can override the provisions’ prohibitions on the use of chemical
weapons. Therefore, he concluded, practitioners should cautiously approach the ICRC study with regard to both the rules and
their larger implications for the field of customary international
humanitarian law.

therein, their acceptance is bound to have an important impact on
customary international law. This was the case with the United
States when it did not ratify the First Additional Protocol in the
1980s, but expressed support for many principles set forth in that
Protocol and believed that many of them should become customary law. According to the ICRC study, most of these principles are
now embodied in international customary law. Matheson contended that the United States approval of these principles likely
played an important role in that result, which illustrates that customary international law often crystallizes around the positions of
important dissenters. “Nonetheless, neither the United States, nor
any other major military power, can effectively protect its interests
or advance international law generally by confining itself to the
role of a perpetual dissenter,” Matheson argued. “It is particularly
important for the U.S. to take a proactive approach in the development of both conventional and customary law and to adhere to
international instruments that adequately protect its interests
when those instruments are available.”
Matheson also spoke of a gap between the comprehensive,
detailed laws governing international armed conflict, and the
smaller and less defined body of treaty and customary law pertaining to internal armed conflicts. This gap, Matheson argued, is illustrated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in which hundreds of
detailed provisions address international armed conflicts, but only
Common Article 3, which requires the humane treatment and
fundamental protections for civilians, addresses domestic conflicts.
The Second Additional Protocol, Matheson continued, and even
the statute of the International Criminal Court, still fail to adequately establish protective principles applicable in non-international armed conflicts.
The ICRC study, Matheson argued, is deeply significant in its
incorporation of other sources of law, such as the Conventional
Weapons Convention, to establish laws pertaining to means and
methods of domestic warfare that are not addressed in the Second
Additional Protocol or in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In
conclusion, Matheson noted that the ICRC study “may become an
important factor in moving states towards recognition of these
principles in internal conflicts.”

LT. COL. BURRUS CARNAHAN (RET.)
LT. COL. BURRUS CARNAHAN (RET.) of the United States Air
Force, principal contributor to the Report to the ICRC on U.S.
Practice in the Field of Customary International Humanitarian
Law, called the study a “magisterial work,” and said that “from
now on every work on the subject of international customary
humanitarian law will have to take the study’s position into
account.” He also offered a critical perspective on the reasoning
behind these rules, in particular Rule 108, which declares that
mercenaries are not lawful combatants and therefore not entitled
to prisoner-of-war (POW) status. Lt. Col. Carnahan argued that
this rule was a regional policy, adopted primarily among subSaharan African states, and later inserted as Article 47 of
Additional Protocol I in 1977 only because other nations present
at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference believed that the term
“mercenary” was too narrowly defined to be applicable outside its
original context. “It is therefore startling to see what is and was
essentially a regional policy elevated to the status of universal, customary law,” Lt. Col. Carnahan said.

PROFESSOR JORDAN PAUST
JORDAN PAUST, LAW FOUNDATION PROFESSOR at the University
of Houston Law Center, addressed the role of customary humani15

study was a tremendous achievement, but argued that future
elaborations on the study should incorporate details from the
practice of warfare.
With respect to the protection of medical aircraft, Col. Parks
explained, there are six international conventions with relevant
provisions, including Additional Protocols I and II. No military
commander has ever relied on a single one of these provisions,
however, to protect medical aircraft. Col. Parks concluded, therefore, that one must consider actual practices in the context of war
to determine the functionality of these provisions. There are no
provisions, he continued, that protect medical aircraft flying in
enemy airspace. For medical aircraft to fly over contact zones, the
aircraft must be subject to orders to land and to be inspected for
purposes of identification. The aircraft can only receive protection
in these narrow circumstances and receives no special protection
under other conditions in enemy airspace.
With regard to Rule 29, which involves protection for medical transports, Col. Parks contended that the provision effectively
protects ground transportation, but neglects to do the same for
medical aircraft. The Geneva Conventions have more specific provisions for the protection of medical aircraft that the ICRC study
should seek to incorporate, such as conveying protected status
upon aircraft painted with Red Cross or Red Crescent insignia.
Col. Parks concluded that the ICRC study is an important contribution to the field of international customary humanitarian law
and that, as a continued exercise, further detail may be incorporated into these rules to provide more comprehensive protections to
HRB
parties in situations of armed conflict.

tarian law and its interface with treaty law. First, he noted that customary international law is based on general patterns of expectation and practice, and not consent. Paust therefore disagreed with
the notion that countries could be “persistent objectors” with
respect to customary rules. He noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal
upheld the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention with respect
to Germany, despite Germany’s objections to the Hague
Convention, because many of these provisions were found to be
binding as a matter of customary international law by 1939.
Paust further noted that the study would be useful as an interpretive aid, not only for international criminal tribunals, but also
for other international and domestic legal bodies. Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention Law of Treaties states that customary law is an
important resource for the interpretation of treaties. The U.S.
Supreme Court, as well as other judicial bodies throughout the
world, has used customary law in decisions concerning treaties and
other questions of international law. Paust remarked that customary law is also a useful source of jus cogens norms (i.e., norms that
cannot be violated by any state), particularly with respect to issues
such as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; due process; and
prohibitions against disappearances.
Finally, Paust spoke of the universal applicability of customary international law and its potential to bind both state and nonstate entities in armed conflicts. Because customary international
humanitarian law applies to individuals, non-states, and belligerent entities, Paust argued, its provisions also apply to stateless
insurgents and binds them to many of the provisions set forth in
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Customary
international law, Paust continued, also provides states with various competencies, such as the customary competence to detain
individuals without trial when reasonably necessary, which is
reflected in Articles 5, 42, and 43 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. In this manner, Paust concluded, customary international law fills gaps in treaty law to provide consistent, reflexive,
and binding obligations to all parties in an armed conflict, and
affords basic protections to all individuals.

ENDNOTES: Review of Conference
1 The Martens clause is a principle embodied in the preamble of the Second
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1977, which reads,
“[R]ecalling that in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of
public conscience.”
2 The “supreme interest” clause states that “[e]ach State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention
if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this
Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” See Chemical Weapons Convention, art. 16, ¶ 2 (Apr. 29, 1997), available at
http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html (accessed Feb. 6,
2006).

COL. W. HAYS PARKS, USMCR (RET.)
COL. W. HAYS PARKS, USMCR (RET.), Adjunct Professor at
WCL, raised specific examples to question the soundness of the
customary rules identified in the ICRC study. His remarks concerned the failure of customary international humanitarian law
to adequately protect medical aircraft. He agreed that the ICRC

ENDNOTES: ASSESSING
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LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR continued from page 12
tional Criminal Court at pt. 2, art. 8, §§ 2(e)(i), (e)(iii), (e)(viii).
28 Because of these uncertainties, the ICRC is seeking to clarify the notion of
direct participation by means of a series of expert meetings that began in 2003.
See, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, “Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,” http://www.icrc.org/
web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/459B0FF70176F4E5C1256DDE00572DAA
(Sept. 2003).

Law, vol. 1, Rule 3 (combatants), Rule 4 (armed forces), Rule 5 (civilians and
civilian population).
26 Additional Protocol II at arts. 13–15, 17–18.
27 See, e.g., Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, art. 3, §§ 7-11 (May 3, 1996), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/575?OpenDocument (accessed Oct. 30, 2005); Protocol III to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, art. 2 (Oct. 10, 1990), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/515?OpenDocument (accessed Oct.
30, 2005); Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines,
preamble (Sept. 18, 1997), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
580?OpenDocument (accessed Oct. 30, 2005); Rome Statute of the Interna-
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